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Abstract
In this paper, a field authentication scheme, suitable for providing more efficient operations within an encrypted database,
is introduced and discussed. Applying the concept of this proposed scheme, the database will be safeguarded and protected for
situations such as a ciphertext search attack, a plaintext substitution attack, and/or a ciphertext substitution attack. In addition, this
proposed scheme can be used to facilitate the “projections” operation executed in the database while also allowing the individual
field value to be decrypted and authenticated. It is also important to note that the “selection” operation can be directly applied to
the resultant database without the tediousness of going through the decryption process by using the random filters concept in the
field authentication. Furthermore, the use of the aforementioned concept can eliminate exposure of some unqualified records and,
as a result, speed up the process of executing the query.
c© 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Security issues have become an increasing concern in the information system field and are certainly the most
urgent challenges in the database area. These growing challenges present additional difficulties for businesses and/or
industries to cope with due to the prevailing popularity of e-business technology [1]. Currently, the approach to
integrating cryptography technology into a relational database management system to resolve the increased security
concerns has become a major focus for both researchers and practitioners in the field of information technology
(IT) and database (DB) professions. By examining recent developments in the areas of data privacy and applications
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security, several of the most common architectures discussed and/or introduced in the construction of a secure database
management system can be found in earlier studies such as those completed by He and Wang [1], Piattini and
Fernandez-Medina [2], and Thuraisingham [3].
The “database encryption with subkeys” method can be used to prevent the disclosure of sensitive data and, hence,
improve the possibility of detecting data security problems [4–8]. In addition, some studies [4,7,8] also describe
several of the most critical disadvantages associated with the “database encryption with subkeys” method. Namely,
these disadvantages include the following three items:
(1) The “projection” operations cannot be applied before the decryption process to eliminate unnecessary fields.
(2) The “selection” operations cannot be performed easily without decrypting all related fields over which the
“selection” operation will be executed and/or applied.
(3) Finally, the “database encryption with subkeys” method may not be appropriate for applications which require the
maintenance of one or two concrete fields in the existing forms of plaintext for the purpose of fast retrieval.
Furthermore, the approach of “database encryption and authentication at the field level” is still a desirable feature
for two subsequent reasons:
(1) Projection operations are allowed to be executed.
(2) Individual field values are allowed to be decrypted and/or authenticated.
This field encryption and authentication system, however, is vulnerable and subject to ciphertext searching attacks
and plaintext/ciphertext substitution attacks. In addition, it is interesting to note the occurrence of three problems
associated with the “database encryption with subkeys” method which do not arise in some research results [4,7,8].
In order to eliminate these three problems, Denning proposed a different and improved modification to the field
encryption and authentication system [6]. Unfortunately, in the system proposed by Denning, “selection” operations
still cannot be applied before the decryption process in order to eliminate unqualified records.
On the basis of the authors’ search findings in this subject area, there have been no other improved field
authentication schemes presented to solve these three problems. In this paper, a novel field authentication scheme
based on the application of random filters is presented. According to this proposed scheme, “selection” operations
can be applied before decryption to eliminate unqualified records. Furthermore, the speed associated with the query
manipulation processes can be enhanced due to the fact that some decryption operations are merely not executed. In
addition, the “projection” operations can also be applied before the decryption process to eliminate unneeded fields.
This paper is organized as follows. Following the introduction section, which details the background and
justification of this proposed scheme, Section 2 reviews the fundamental concepts of Denning’s scheme. The proposed
field authentication scheme is then presented in Section 3 while Section 4 describes the cryptographic relational
operations. The cryptanalysis and discussion of the proposed scheme is given in Section 5 and finally the last section,
Section 6, concludes this paper.
2. A review of Denning’s scheme
Before review of Denning’s scheme is completed, the underlying cryptographic algorithm should be introduced.
The cryptographic technique adopted in Denning’s study is the Data Encryption Standard (DES) [9], a symmetric
algorithm. However, DES was definitively proved insecure in July 1998 [10]. Furthermore, the algorithms of DES
or 3DES are relatively sluggish in software and both of DES and 3DES use only the 64-bit block size. For reasons
of efficiency and security, a larger block size is desirable [10]. Therefore, the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) had been working within the industry and the associated cryptographic community to develop
an Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). The ultimate goal of this aforementioned development is to create a
Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) that specifies an encryption algorithm capable of protecting sensitive
information well into the next century. On November 26, 2001, NIST announced that it had selected Rijndael as a
final standard for the proposed AES algorithm [11]. As a result, the authors suggest the adoption of the AES as the
underlying cryptographic algorithm in regards to the proposed novel scheme discussed in this paper.
Consider a file of N records with each record having M fields. Suppose, perhaps, that one of the important
objectives is to maintain the secrecy of the data stored in some field j in each record. Obviously, encrypting the
field value with a secret key (or subkey) x is the simplest method to accomplish this objective. Let Ex (p) and Dx (p)
denote the process of encryption and decryption of plaintext p under the secret key x .
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Let pi j be the field value for field j of the record i . Consequently, the corresponding ciphertext ci j = Ex (pi j ) can
be obtained. Further, ci j can be used to replace pi j as the j th field value in the record i . From the previous discussion,
this field encryption scheme with the same key is insecure and is subject to ciphertext searching attacks. Therefore,
one possible solution of preventing a ciphertext searching attack is for each field value pi j to encrypt with a distinct
secret key xi j . Obviously, the ciphertext will be changed due to the fact that ci j = Exi j (pi j ) is obtained by using the
specific key xi j .
As for the generation of the secret key xi j , some assumptions must be clearly made to facilitate the following
discussion in this study. These assumptions are listed as follows:
(1) Each field has a field identification number which can be used to uniquely identify the field.
(2) Let the first field of each record be the primary key, which can be utilized to uniquely identify a particular record
and cannot be encrypted.
(3) Let ri (=pi1) be the primary key for the record i and F j be the field identification number of the field j .
As a result, the secret key xi j is defined as g(ri , F j , x), where g() is a key generation function satisfying that
g(ri , F j , x) = E(Ex(ri))(F j ).
On the other hand, let si j be the field authenticator of the value ci j in the field j for a specific record i such
that si j = Ex (ci j ). The authenticator is the encrypted ciphertext. Consequently, the pair (ci j , si j ) is stored in the
encrypted database. Unfortunately, this pair is still vulnerable and subject to the aforementioned plaintext or ciphertext
substitution attack. If an intruder interchanges the pair (ci j , si j ) of the record i and the pair (chj , shj ) of the record h,
any authorized user cannot detect this change caused by the intruder. This problem arises whenever the authenticators
are generated using the same secret key.
To eliminate this problem, Denning’s study [6] developed a field authentication scheme such that each field
authenticator is generated by virtue of encrypting each field value with a distinct secret key xi j . The field authenticator
si j is generated by si j = Exi j (ci j ). Both ci j and si j will then be stored as the j th field value of the record i .
To recover the field value pi j from the encrypted database, the ciphertext ci j must be verified first and then be
decrypted. Similar to the process of encryption, the secret key xi j is initially generated by computing g(ri , F j , x).
Consequently, the following task is to check whether Exi j (ci j ) is equal to si j or not. If this is true, then decrypt the
ciphertext ci j into the original field value pi j by using the secret key xi j .
3. The proposed novel scheme
The purpose of the field authentication is to verify whether or not some of the field values decrypted from the
encrypted database have been altered without authorization. The trivial way to accomplish this requirement is to store
a cryptographic authenticator within each record. The authenticator, of course, is a cryptographic function of the entire
record. As a result, the authenticator can be recomputed from the field values when the target record is retrieved. If the
computed authenticator is equal to the stored authenticator, the record may be altered or changed with the probability
of 1/2A, where A represents the length of the authenticator in bits. Even though it is discovered that some record has
been altered, there is no way to know which individual field of this record has been modified. This is because the
authenticator is computed from all field values contained in the record and the alteration of any field value will result
in a subsequent variation of authentication of this record. Therefore, to authenticate an individual field, Denning’s
study introduced a method to utilize the authenticators within individual fields [6].
With the help of the concept introduced in Denning’s study, a novel field authentication scheme is proposed in
this section based on the concept of random filters. In this scheme, each record has a record authenticator which is
related to all field values. Based on the indication of the record authenticator, a user can understand whether or not any
individual field value has been modified without checking the projection of the other fields. That is, the user can detect
modification only based on the record authenticator. Therefore, field authentication can be provided in this scheme
without storing any other field authenticator. Let the i th record Ri have M field values pi1, pi2, . . . , and piM , and
have M field secret subkeys f1, f2, . . . , fM . Then, the next step is to figure out how to generate an authenticator of
record Ri . The idea of the proposed strategy comes primarily from the random filter concept [12].
Assume there are some memory bits served as the hash space and there are several, say d, hash functions. Let
the hash space of the random filter be k individual addressable bits with the addresses 0 through k − 1, where these
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k bits are used to serve as a record authenticator. In the beginning, all bits in the hash space are preliminarily set
to be 0s. Each field value in the field j concatenates the subkey f j to generate (pi j ‖ f j ), where “‖” represents
the concatenation operator. The (pi j ‖ f j ) is then hash-coded into d bit addresses, say b1, b2, . . . , bd , where b1,
b2, . . . , bd need not to be all unique. Finally, all d bits addressed by b1, b2, . . . , bd are all set to be the value of 1 s.
While a given decrypted field value is being authenticated, a sequence of bit addresses, b′1, b′2, . . . , b′d , can be
generated according to the field value and the corresponding subkey by utilizing the same approach as discussed in
previous sections. If the d bits addressed by b′1, b′2, . . ., b′d in the authenticator are all 1 s, the decrypted field value is
considered to be correct. An example will be presented next to demonstrate the above discussion.
Example
Suppose a record Ri includes four fields, of which the field values are pi1, pi2, pi3 and pi4. There are also four
field subkeys named as f1, f2, f3 and f4 and the hash functions used in random filters are {h1, h2, h3, h4}. A hash
space of 40 individual addressable bits can then be used as a record authenticator, addressed by a range of 0 through
39. The following results list the output of all hash functions with the input, pi1, pi2, pi3, and pi4.
h1(pi1 ‖ f1) = 17, h2(pi1 ‖ f1) = 31, h3(pi1 ‖ f1) = 9, h4(pi1 ‖ f1) = 22
h1(pi2 ‖ f2) = 9, h2(pi2 ‖ f2) = 13, h3(pi2 ‖ f2) = 14, h4(pi2 ‖ f2) = 11
h1(pi3 ‖ f3) = 0, h2(pi3 ‖ f3) = 16, h3(pi3 ‖ f3) = 7, h4(pi3 ‖ f3) = 16
h1(pi4 ‖ f4) = 6, h2(pi4 ‖ f4) = 32, h3(pi4 ‖ f4) = 3, h4(pi4 ‖ f4) = 26.
Note that these hash values are not distinct. For instance, h2(pi3 ‖ f3) = h4(pi3 ‖ f3) = 16. Based on the hash
values computed above, a record authenticator of Ri can be generated as follows.
Initial state:
Address: 0 8 16 24 32
Authenticator: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
After the insertion of pi1:
Address: 0 8 16 24 32
Authenticator: 00000000 0¬000000 0¬0000¬0 0000000¬ 00000000
After the insertion of pi2:
Address: 0 8 16 24 32
Authenticator: 00000000 0¬0¬0¬¬0 01000010 00000001 00000000
After the insertion of pi3:
Address: 0 8 16 24 32
Authenticator: ¬000000¬ 01010110 ¬1000010 00000001 00000000
After the insertion of pi4:
Address: 0 8 16 24 32
Authenticator: 100¬00¬1 01010110 11000010 00¬00001 ¬0000000
The final result of the authenticator is stored as the record authenticator Ai . If the verification as to whether or
not the decrypted field value p′ corresponding to field 2 is contained in the record Ri is required, the following
computation must be done.
h1(p′ ‖ f2) = 9, h2(p′ ‖ f2) = 13, h3(p′ ‖ f2) = 14, h4(p′ ‖ f2) = 11.
As a result, we can conclude that the decrypted field value p′ which corresponds to field 2 is contained in the record
Ri because the 9th, 11th, 13th, 14th addresses of the record authenticator Ai are all equal to 1. However, for another
p′′, it does satisfy h1(p′′ ‖ f2) = 17, h2(p′′ ‖ f2) = 13, h3(p′′ ‖ f2) = 7, h4(p′′ ‖ f2) = 26, but a false drop may
occur. It means that p′′ is not contained in this record but the authenticator gives wrong information.
Furthermore, according to a study done by Wang et al. [12], we can derive the following properties:
(1) If the number of executable hash functions d and the size of the record authenticator k are fixed, then the false
drop probability and verification time are increasing as the number of fields M increases.
(2) If the number of fields M and the number of executable hash functions d are fixed, then the false drop probability
and verification time are decreasing as the size of the record authenticator k increases.
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(3) If the number of fields M and the size of the record authenticator k are fixed, the lowest false drop probability will
be obtained when the hash space is half-full of 1 s. Based on this result, an optimal random filter can be made by
choosing
d = ln
1
2
M ln
(
1− 1k
) .
4. Cryptographic relational algebra
In the database, projection is one of the most important relational operations in which the ID of one or more fields
is retrieved to form another sub-database [13]. If the encrypted database uses the field encryption scheme to protect
sensitive data, projection can then be used directly to form another encrypted sub-database without decryption. That
is, the projection can be still regarded as one of cryptographic relational operations for the encrypted database.
In the following algorithm, another important operation, selection, is presented.
Algorithm: Selection
Input: N records [ci1 = ri , ci2, . . . , ciM , Ai ], i = 1, 2, . . . , N , are in an encrypted database; the queried field value
v is associated to the field j .
Output: Whether the j th field value of encrypted records is equivalent to v.
Step 1: Set an integer S of k bits all to 0s.
Step 2: Compute T = (v ‖ f j ). /∗ f j as the secret key of the field j.∗/
Step 3: Hash-code T into d bit addresses, say b1, b2, . . . , bd . For this k-bit S, set all these d bits addressed by b1 to
bd as 1 s.
Step 4: Set n to 1.
Step 5: If An & S is equal to S, then generates the cryptographic key xnj = g(rn, F j , x) and computes the j th field
value pnj = Dxnj (cnj ), and if pnj == v then output the record n. /∗ “&” denotes the bitwise AND operator,
An is the record authenticator of the record n.∗/
Step 6: Let n = n + 1.
Step 7: If n > N , then go to Step 8; otherwise return to Step 5.
Step 8: Stop.
5. Cryptanalysis and discussion
It is interesting to note that the ciphertext search attack as well as a plaintext or ciphertext substitution attack cannot
threaten the proposed scheme since each field value is encrypted with a different cryptographic key. Additionally,
the attacker is not able to derive other encrypted data from the given data or its ciphertext. In this section, some
cryptographic considerations involved in the development of the field authentication scheme will be addressed. In an
earlier version of the field authentication scheme, each field value pi j in the field j of the record i is hash-coded into
d bit addresses. The d bit addresses of the record authenticator are all set to 1 s. Assume the domain D of some fields
is small, and contains n data elements, say D1, D2, . . . , Dn . The following attack can be executed to find the original
data. Given an encrypted record R′i , including the record authenticator Ai , a data element D j can be chosen from the
domain D and hash-coded into d bit addresses. If all d bit addresses of the record authenticator Ai are 1 s, then D j
may be the original field value. Once all elements in the domain D have been evaluated, all candidate data elements
that satisfy the above authentication can be collected. If only one candidate data element remains, the original field
value can be found. Otherwise, the size of the search domain D at least can be reduced further. This kind of attack,
however, causes no threat to the proposed field authentication scheme because no data can be hash-coded without
knowledge of the secret key.
In an encrypted database, it is best to keep content encrypted during the manipulation of the query process. The
encryption scheme proposed in this study can avoid exposure of important or sensitive data. As in earlier discussions,
there are two essential relational operations, i.e. projection and selection, in the database. If the encrypted database
uses the field encryption scheme, it can then use the projection operation to produce another encrypted sub-database
without decryption. This is due to the fact that the data retrieval process is based on the ID and not the value of a
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Table 1
Comparison of Denning’s and our schemes
Denning’s scheme Proposed scheme
Selection (one field) 2+ 2N DES operations dN hash operations
Storage
∑N
i=1
∑M
j=1(log ci j + log si j )
∑N
i=1
∑M
j=1(log ci j + log Ai ) ≈ MNT + Nk
particular field. Consequently, it implies that there will be no need to decrypt the data. On the other hand, it is more
difficult to implement in situations involving the selection operation. This result is primarily due to the fact that the
selection operation retrieves records based on the value of the field. The value of the field cannot be used for selection
operations without performing the decryption process first. However, for the sake of avoiding unnecessary exposure of
sensitive data, we propose to use the concept of random filter in an encrypted database. This idea is applied in order to
screen out the impossible records first, and then to search for the particular target record within the remaining records.
Of course, some limitations of this proposed method still exist. There will be a need to decrypt the field value to
make sure that it is the desired record. Moreover, the d value will directly affect the probability of finding the value
of a specific field, which is not the desired outcome to be searched for. It is also interesting to note that, for the sake
of reducing the above-mentioned probability introduced by a different d value, the optimal choice for d is ln
1
2
M ln(1− 1k )
,
where M is the number of fields and k is the size of record authentication. k should be kept unchanged. This is simply
because a larger k value will result in a lower false drop probability but at the expense of additionally required amounts
of memory space.
For the purpose of evaluating performance of the proposed method, we compare the Denning’s scheme with our
scheme in terms of data storage and speed of database operations (selection of one field). The detailed result is listed
in the following Table 1.
From Table 1, Denning’s scheme needs 2 + 2N DES operations and our scheme needs dN hash operations for
selection of one field. Based on [14], SHA-1 operation is ten times faster than DES operation. Let d = 10 and since
k = 1
1−( 12 )
1
Md
[12], then false drop probability is smaller than 0.001. Under such a condition, the selection operation
of our scheme is two times faster than Denning’s scheme. If d is equal to 20, then the false drop probability is
9.53674E-07 and both schemes are almost of same speed.
Denning’s scheme needs storage about
∑N
i=1
∑M
j=1(log ci j + log si j ) for a file of N records with M fields in each
record. If the T -bits AES is used, then the storage needed is almost equal to
∑N
i=1
∑M
j=1(log ci j + log si j ) ≈ 2MNT .
However, our scheme needs storage about
∑N
i=1
∑M
j=1(log ci j + log Ai ) ≈ MNT + Nk. Based on [12] and numerical
results, we have k = 1
1−( 12 )
1
Md
≤ M 1
1−( 12 )
1
d
for M < 1.07 × 1013. If d = 20 and M < 1.07 × 1013, then
k ≤ 30M . That means, comparing to the storage of Denning’s scheme, the storage of our scheme reduces about
2MNT−MNT−Nk
2MNT ≥ MNT−30MN2MNT = T−302T while the size of database is smaller than 1.07 × 1013. Since AES is at least
128 bits, then the reduced space is about T−302T ≥ 128−30256 = 0.38 = 38%.
6. Conclusions
In this paper, a novel field authentication scheme based on the random filters concept was proposed. This scheme
can perform field authentication based on a specific record authenticator. Furthermore, in cryptographic relational
algebra, the projection operations can be applied before the process of decryption to eliminate unnecessary fields. The
selection operations can also be performed to filter out unqualified records. As discussed earlier, this proposed scheme
can not only enhance the performance of selection and projection operations due to the elimination of unnecessary
decryption but also can reduce the storage space required to process/handle the data. Therefore, this proposed scheme
can be used in the sensitive database to protect important data with efficient operations.
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